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A stitch in time
Preserving peace on Bougainville
Executive summary
From late 1997 to mid-2003, Australia at first supported and 
then led a pathbreaking unarmed regional peacekeeping 
mission that helped end a decade of conflict on Bougainville. 
The mission ensured that large-scale fighting didn’t resume 
and bought time to prepare for a more measured and 
orderly future political settlement. Sadly, those preparations 
haven’t been sufficient to give confidence that a workable 
political settlement has taken shape. The Papua New 
Guinea Government, donors, neighbours and officials on 
Bougainville have failed to build the capacity needed by the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) to remediate 
the causes of the 1990s conflict.
Bougainvilleans do not yet have realistic options to choose 
either autonomy or independence. Although there have 
been some positive developments, most indicators are far 
from encouraging as the 2015–20 window for a referendum 
approaches. Misunderstandings between Port Moresby 
and the ABG persist, while Bougainville remains a deeply 
divided society. Economic imperatives to resume mining add 
new pressures. The most likely referendum outcome at the 
moment—Papua New Guinea refusing to ratify a clear but far 
from unanimous vote for an independence Bougainville is 
utterly unprepared for—would be destabilising.
Australian interests will be profoundly engaged if the 
Bougainville situation deteriorates sharply. But while 
Canberra has the capability to reintervene, the cost and risks 
of doing so would be high.
This report sets out a plan that Australia should adopt 
now to help deliver a sustainable solution for the future 
of Bougainville. The proposal is designed to help prevent 
the need for a costly military intervention of the type seen 
so regularly in the Pacific in the past 15 years. A concerted 
pre-referendum focus on peacebuilding in Bougainville, 
coordinated with regional partners, will forestall the need for 
a Timor or Solomon Islands-style stabilisation later.
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The case for prompt action
The Bougainville situation presents an early test case 
for the Abbott government’s credentials for focusing 
Australian foreign policy more on our immediate region. An 
Australian-led regional effort to strengthen the foundations 
for peace on Bougainville also creates an opportunity to 
validate the effectiveness of Canberra’s decision to more 
closely align Australia’s foreign, development and trade 
efforts in order to advance specific national interests.
More than anything, Bougainville needs its economy and 
infrastructure developed to help sustain peace. A new 
international effort to assist Bougainville could be thought of 
as a preventive development initiative to forestall the need 
for another peacekeeping mission. Bougainville’s current 
share of Australian aid to Papua New Guinea (PNG), although 
higher than its proportion of the population, doesn’t deliver 
enough impact to reflect its importance to Australia. A 
greater effort on development assistance could make up 
crucial lost ground in areas such as public safety, community 
awareness and legal, business and administrative capacity.
Key Australian elements of the peace initiative 
should include:
•	 establishing a high-priority task force to lead the 
implementation of a strategy for Bougainville
•	 tripling development assistance to Bougainville from 
within current aid funding
•	 a special emphasis on training the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government (ABG), particularly by 
Australians willing to work on Bougainville under the 
Australian Government’s New Colombo Plan
•	 enhanced Australian Federal Police (AFP) support for the 
Bougainville Police
•	 initiating low-key defence contributions to rebuilding 
efforts
•	 international advocacy (including through Australia’s 
temporary seat on the UN Security Council)
•	 particularly encouraging Pacific island nations’ 
involvement in a regional solution for Bougainville
•	 a strong focus on empowering female and community 
voices for peace on Bougainville
•	 supporting a closer and more sustained dialogue 
within PNG.
Temporary capital Buka
Population 175,160 (2000 census; many later 
estimates are higher)
Area 9,384 square kilometres
Languages 21
Life expectancy Males 58.8 years; females 
60.4 years
Top agricultural activities 
for households
Coconut, food crops, cocoa, buai 
(betel nut), poultry
Annual income per capita Around 3,500 kina ($1,350) (the 
PNG average is approximately 
$2,100)
 Bougainville at a glance
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Bougainville came under Australian control during World 
War I after a short period as part of German New Guinea 
from 1885.
Its inhabitants are far from homogeneous, speak 
21 languages and have diverse traditions, but share closer 
geographical and ethnic links with the former British 
colony of Solomon Islands than with mainland PNG. This 
gave Bougainville a weak but distinct identity as a ‘special 
case’ within PNG—reinforced by heavy fighting on the 
island in World War II1 and the discovery of copper and 
gold in 1964.
Bougainville stayed with PNG after independence in 1975 
in return for a provincial government system disastrously 
applied across the whole country. Income from the 
Panguna mine operated by a Rio Tinto Zinc subsidiary, 
Bougainville Copper Limited, freed PNG from total 
dependence on Canberra.
In 1988, an aggrieved Bougainvillean mine worker, 
Francis Ona, led a sabotage campaign by a small group of 
dissidents aimed at disrupting mining and redistributing 
its benefits. Traditional cultural mechanisms and modern 
royalty arrangements were struggling to cope with new 
types of inequality and with transferring unfamiliar forms 
of material wealth between the national and provincial 
governments, among different areas near the mine 
(particularly those only indirectly affected by massive 
social dislocation and environmental impacts, who 
thus missed out on compensation) and among different 
generations of landowners from the most affected areas.2
A heavy-handed attempt to quell this localised violence 
by PNG riot police and later the military supercharged 
Bougainvillean identity and gave further attacks an 
increasingly ethnic and separatist character, ultimately 
spurring a campaign for independence and the 
formation of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), 
which closed the mine in May 1989 and called for 
massive compensation.
The BRA prompted the departure of the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force (which then imposed a naval 
blockade), followed by the police in March 1990, and 
declared independence in May, but didn’t consolidate 
its control. Made up of a loose coalition of independent 
groups of mostly unemployed young men with various 
aims, individual BRA elements turned to settling 
conflict-era and older scores rather than halting the 
violence, extorting and terrorising perceived enemies as 
well as many wealthier and educated Bougainvilleans.
In this near anarchy, local leaders with the support of 
anti-BRA militias invited government forces to return to 
Buka in late 1990, and to many other parts of Bougainville 
in 1991–92.
Violence between rebels, the security forces, 
pro-government groups and armed criminal gangs took 
on the character of a civil war. Internationally supported 
peace initiatives in late 1994 and early 1996 were derailed 
by BRA hardliners and Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force (PNGDF) spoilers. Although women’s and other 
moderate groups willing to negotiate and forgo immediate 
secession emerged in core areas of BRA support in central 
Bougainville, and formed a transitional government in 
April 1995, continuing mistrust and repeated unsuccessful 
military offensives maintained the stalemate.
With an election looming, the PNG Government engaged 
a mercenary outfit, Sandline International, to train the 
PNGDF, decapitate the hardline rebel leadership and 
reopen the mine. However, in March 1997, the commander 
of the PNGDF ejected Sandline and forced the Prime 
Minister and key ministers to stand down ahead of an 
inquiry. The crisis had threatened to take violence to a new 
level on Bougainville and shook Port Moresby to the core 
but provided added incentives for peace.
The 1988–97 crisis
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In the wake of the March 1997 Sandline crisis, 
Bougainvilleans and the PNG Government under 
newly elected Prime Minister Bill Skate were ready for 
peace negotiations.
They attempted a settlement, committing to a truce at 
Burnham in New Zealand in October 1997 and agreeing 
to the arrival of an unarmed truce monitoring team led 
by New Zealand and including Australian, Fijian and 
ni-Vanuatu personnel.
The January 1998 Lincoln Agreement, also signed in New 
Zealand, established a ceasefire, set specific conditions 
for peace and reconciliation, and prepared for the 
Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) to replace 
the truce monitoring team in May. Given initial misgivings 
about Australian motivations, the PMG was at pains to 
remain definitively neutral at all times. It acted primarily 
as a monitoring group, reporting compliance with the 
agreement and spreading information about the peace 
process via regular patrolling from six team sites. The 
300 military and civilian monitors were reduced to 200 
after 2000.
Following the Arawa Peace Agreement in August 2001, 
the PMG focused on facilitating the weapons disposal 
pillar of the agreement, instilling community confidence, 
and promoting the implementation of the agreement in 
cooperation with a small UN observer mission.
From late June 2003, the PMG was replaced by a small 
Bougainville Transition Team of 17 unarmed civilians that 
operated until the end of the year.
Although Francis Ona remained outside the process, 
the PMG had helped provide sufficient confidence for 
the PNG Government to gazette the Constitution for the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville in December 2004, 
and the region held successful elections in June 2005.
The 1997–2003 peacekeeping mission
More than 30,000 Australians served, and 516 were killed, on Bougainville during World War II. Photo courtesy Australian War Memorial, AWM 018089. 
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The positive conditions created by 
innovative peacekeeping from 1997–2003 
are fading
The 1988–1997 Bougainville crisis was the bloodiest and most 
protracted conflict in Australia’s South Pacific 
neighbourhood since World War II. Neither Australia nor the 
region was able to mount an effective response to what was 
an internal PNG dilemma during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
but astute planning and execution delivered a truce in 1997, a 
ceasefire in 1998 and a peace agreement in 2001. The process 
that led to this outcome drew on Melanesian strengths and 
creative international support to halt the violence and 
epitomised creative peacemaking. It capitalised on the ‘ripe 
moment’ for conflict management lent by a military 
stalemate, mutual war weariness, large-scale deaths and 
economic destruction and the unhappy circuit-breaker 
provided by the Sandline affair—Port Moresby’s abortive 
attempt to use a foreign mercenary force to shift the military 
balance against the Bougainville rebels.
The peace formula also borrowed from the success of the 
1988 Matignon and 1990 Noumea accords in New Caledonia 
by deferring a decision on independence in favour of a long 
period of preparation before a referendum on the matter. In 
Bougainville’s case, preserving the national government’s 
effective veto power by making the outcome of the 
referendum subject to ratification by the PNG Parliament 
gave Port Moresby the confidence to sign the deal. The 
agreement’s key pillars involved allowing substantial 
autonomy, a weapons disposal plan, and a referendum 
between 10 and 15 years after the election of the first ABG, 
which occurred in June 2005.
Another important ingredient of success was the plan’s 
deliberately light touch, which maximised the degree of 
control and ownership by parties to the process. Less activist 
international involvement helped contain costs, reduce 
local dependency, promote the intervention’s fit to specific 
circumstances (and thus its sustainability), manage safety 
risks, and facilitate an exit strategy.3
Rebels of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, 1997. © Alex Smailes/Sygma/Corbis 
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Some positive developments have continued since the 
withdrawal of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) in August 
2003. Most schools, aid posts and roads have reopened, 
the copra and cocoa industries revived (although they’re 
currently depressed, with only some of the slack picked up 
by small-scale gold production), and Bougainville elections 
succeeded in 2005 and 2010. The national government 
released significant restoration and special funds to the 
ABG last year; the Panguna Peace Building Strategy was 
relaunched early this year; reconciliation between key 
leaders and factions is continuing, including in Me’ekamui; 
and the Joint Review of Autonomy Arrangements is 
finally underway.
Yet peacekeeping was a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for enduring stability. The benefits of that light 
peacekeeping approach and on-the-ground development 
provided a strong foundation to build on that hasn’t 
entirely dissipated. The longer term success of the peace 
process, however, was premised on a level of continuing 
national and international attention, practical support and 
investment that regrettably hasn’t eventuated. Crucially, ABG 
capacity-building has been neglected.
The PNG Government has mostly acted in good faith 
but, although it’s enjoyed sustained economic growth, it 
remains responsible for a large, diverse, developing country 
that faces myriad other challenges. It hasn’t regularly or 
reliably fulfilled all its funding and other obligations under 
the peace agreement. While the fitfulness of its support 
stems mainly from funding and capacity constraints, there 
are also grumbles in Port Moresby that it’s providing the 
means for Bougainville to potentially withdraw from PNG. In 
early 2011, Prime Minister O’Neill (then the PNG Treasurer) 
undertook to release a 100 million kina grant for high-impact 
development projects every year for five years. This was 
in addition to unconditional recurrent funding for public 
service costs and an annual restoration and development 
grant (now significantly in arrears). However, Port Moresby’s 
more ‘hands-on’ approach to allocating such spending has 
occurred on O’Neill’s watch, too—fuelling complaints that 
Bougainville is being treated like an ordinary province rather 
than an autonomous region with a special status and a 
massive need for rebuilding.
On Bougainville, ABG leaders often blame serious corruption 
on their inability to discipline administrators who will remain 
members of the national public service until the Bougainville 
Public Service is formally established next year. In fact, nearly 
all are both ethnically Bougainvillean and responsive to the 
ABG, while a handful of underperforming officials have been 
stood down. Ineptitude, misconduct and infighting remain 
among the Bougainville members of the PNG Parliament and 
Bougainville’s Executive Council, House of Representatives 
and administration.
Even at the height of Australian-led peacekeeping efforts, 
when Canberra was spending around 8% of its aid to PNG 
on Bougainville, there was a general view that Australian 
aid couldn’t and shouldn’t meet the autonomous region’s 
entire development and reconstruction needs, and a view 
in AusAID that Bougainville was a special case but already 
overrepresented compared to other parts of the country.4 
For a range of reasons, this peace dividend shrank as a 
proportion of overall aid during the period from 2005 to 2010, 
when AusAID’s budget was rapidly expanding but focused 
purely on poverty reduction.
Australia has provided over $250 million in aid to 
support Bougainville’s peace process and post-conflict 
reconstruction, but that’s only just over 4% of our 
development assistance to PNG since 1997 for almost 3% 
of PNG’s population. This year, some $35 million (6%) of the 
$501 million allocated to PNG will be spent on Bougainville 
via its share of the national education, law and justice, 
transport and health sectors (which provides most of 
Bougainville’s medicines, for example), as well as support for 
almost two dozen short- and long-term contracted advisers 
and specialists.5 All such assistance is necessarily delivered 
under the terms of the bilateral development cooperation 
treaty governing Australian aid to PNG. But while our 
assistance nearly doubled over the past three years under 
AusAID, with the referendum approaching, it was off a low 
base and still far too little, too late to make up lost ground.
The chief risk stemming from inadequate attention and 
unreliable funding is that:
[W]ith Port Moresby doing so little to persuade 
Bougainvilleans that they will be better off in PNG, 
Bougainvilleans will be likely to vote for independence. 
Then if the PNG Parliament votes it down, guns could 
come out of hiding, guns could come back from the 
Solomon Islands and warlords once again have a 
large following.6
High stakes
In fact, it’s not certain that Bougainville will return to bloody 
conflict even if Port Moresby refuses to ratify a vote for 
independence. Neither PNG’s security forces nor the various 
Bougainville factions, which bore much of the pain of the 
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1988–97 crisis, currently have any appetite or capacity for 
real hostilities. The leaders at the top of those organisations 
personally experienced the deprivations of the war and see 
no need to further prove their warrior credentials. But all 
sides could easily be painted into corners by provocation 
or miscalculation.
This risk is growing as memories of the crisis recede. The 
current generation of fighting-age Bougainville youth lack 
first-hand experience of the hardships of combat and have 
a patchy education to draw on. While the risk is tempered 
by folk-memories of the horrors of the conflict, those 
who started the sabotage campaign in 1988 represented 
a minority view at the time and had little in the way of a 
strategy, military skills, or firepower beyond some stolen 
mining explosives. In Port Moresby, a greater proportion 
of the senior leaders forced to manage the most damaging 
effects of the crisis have left public life. The emerging 
generation of national leaders, while pragmatic, can be as 
nationalistic as earlier statesmen, and are bullish thanks 
to robust growth and making it through the 2011–12 
constitutional crises.
Many of the difficult social and material issues that fuelled 
the 1988–97 crisis—particularly unemployment among young 
men and the divergence of pro- and anti-independence views 
in different parts of the region—remain unresolved. Armed 
militias and criminal groups still clashed periodically in the 
south until 2011 and could be remobilised to pursue political 
ends. And while the mining catalyst for the crisis has been 
absent, cautious moves are underway towards resuming the 
only realistic economic basis for independence or meaningful 
autonomy. (Competing international mining interests have 
also co-opted Bougainvillean leaders, including some 
ostensibly anti-mining figures.)
The approach of the referendum adds to these pressures. 
Many observers suggest that a majority of Bougainvilleans 
would currently opt for independence but that a considerable 
minority would vote to stay with PNG, with PNG exercising 
its prerogative under the peace agreement not to ratify 
the result.
Those with the most to lose from any resumption of 
conflict would be the people on Bougainville and the 
PNG Government. In addition to the approximately 
300 PNG security personnel and more than a thousand 
Bougainvilleans directly killed in fighting, an unknown 
number—possibly around 10,000—died as a result of being 
cut off from medical care, pharmaceuticals and their gardens 
during the blockade.7 Thousands of women and girls were 
raped, more than a third of the population lost their homes 
or became internally displaced, a generation missed out on 
education, and the local economy collapsed. PNG lost 36% of 
its gross export earnings and 17% of government revenues. 
Prime Minister Peter O’Neill Elected August 2012; has a 
commanding majority in PNG 
Parliament
President John Momis Former Catholic priest and 
Constitution co-author; faces  
ABG elections in 2015
Francis Ona Former Bougainville Copper 
surveyor and Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
founder; died of malaria in 2005, 
still rejecting peace
Sam Kauona Former PNGDF lieutenant and 
later BRA head; now a local 
leader and businessman
Ishmael Torama A former BRA company 
commander; remains an 
influential ex-combatant
Joseph Kabui An ex-rebel leader; ABG’s first 
president from June 2005; died in 
office in 2008
Theodore Miriung A Nasioi rebel; formed the 
moderate Bougainville 
Transitional Government in April 
1995 but was assassinated in 
late 1996
Sister Lorraine Garasu OA A Buka nun known for her 
outspokenness for peace 
and reconciliation
Peter Taylor Managing Director of Bougainville 
Copper Ltd. since March 2000
James Tanis A former rebel; was ABG 
President from 2009 to 2010 after 
a by-election to replace Kabui
Sam Akoitai Anti-BRA Resistance militia 
leader; later peacemaker and 
PNG Minister 1997–99, 2002–08
Patrick Nisira ABG Vice President 2010; 
a moderate with wartime 
credentials; spent nine years 
in jail for rebel activities
Rose Pihei An eminent female member (one 
of three) in Bougainville’s House 
of Representatives
 Some key players
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Key institutions of the PNG state were badly weakened and 
Port Moresby’s regional leadership seriously damaged by its 
misguided resort to using mercenaries. Although PNG is no 
longer economically dependent on Bougainville’s natural 
resources, any resumption of serious conflict would seriously 
harm PNG’s reputation and weaken international investment.
Australia’s interests
Although the risk of renewed conflict is fundamentally 
PNG’s and the ABG’s challenge to manage, Australia has a 
major stake in regional stability, too. Even if a PNG–ABG 
stand-off didn’t lead to violence, it would squeeze Australia 
uncomfortably between impulses to accept the results of a 
peace process we sponsored and the imperative to stand by 
the more influential partner, PNG.
Our interests would be even sharper if violence re-emerges. 
As Graeme Dobell argues, public comfort with recent regional 
stabilisation operations in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands 
as well as Bougainville has quietly transformed Australia’s 
instinct for strategic denial close to home into providing a 
de facto regional security guarantee.8 Canberra doesn’t have 
a realistic option to stay aloof in the face of serious instability 
in our near approaches, and we have strategic, business 
and reputational interests in PNG. Renewed disorder in 
Bougainville could destabilise its neighbour, Solomon 
Islands, other parts of PNG and other parts of the Pacific. Our 
security partners will also expect us to act if the situation 
starts to unravel or there seems a risk of outside powers 
gaining undue influence.
However, a revived Australian-led peacekeeping mission in 
Bougainville would entail significant cost and risk. Direct ADF 
aspects of the 1997–2003 mission cost over $109 million and 
the accidental death of a serviceman. A reintervention after 
mid-2015 would potentially be much larger and more costly, 
and closer in size and shape to the more complex missions in 
Solomon Islands or even Timor-Leste than the limited effort 
that was appropriate in 1997. Those bigger interventions 
cost $350 million and $4.3 billion, respectively, while we’re 
still spending around $125 million each year on post-conflict 
reconstruction, ten years on, through the scaled-down 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 
If a new generation slides into bloodshed on Bougainville, 
Canberra couldn’t wait a decade for a military stalemate to 
reappear before intervening. Furthermore, renewed violence 
would present a much more dangerous environment for 
peacemaking than late-phase intervention did in 1997–98.
A preventive development initiative
There’s a better option than just waiting for the situation 
to deteriorate. Given what’s at stake, Australia should lead 
a new international assistance effort to avoid the future 
need to reintervene militarily. As noted, some signs of 
greater attention and activity are already apparent. PNG’s 
Joint Supervisory Body, which had only met twice in the 
last two years, has finally reconvened; Australia has just 
deployed five Australian Civilian Corps experts to join the 
contracted advisers; and the UN is offering Peacebuilding 
Fund support. But a more concerted and much expanded 
program is needed to create the conditions set out in the 
peace agreement to allow a real choice between meaningful 
autonomy and viable independence.
Although the soon-to-be-released Joint Review of Autonomy 
Arrangements may provide a sound roadmap for the next 
steps in the peace process, and while there are grounds to be 
hopeful that Port Moresby and the ABG will reach agreement 
to release the next tranche of impact project funding, even 
that 100 million kina ($38 million) per year to be spent 
on infrastructure projects simply won’t go far to provide 
the level of investment, expertise and impetus to make 
autonomy work. Of the four aspects of the joint review—
legal, administrative, financial and social–developmental—
the last is most crucial to addressing underlying tensions. The 
ABG’s meagre resources and bureaucracy, however, are far 
from sufficient to restore damaged physical, economic and 
social infrastructure.
A preventive development initiative would be consistent with 
the Australian Government’s intent to more closely align our 
foreign, development assistance and trade efforts to focus 
finite aid resources on advancing specific national interests.
Key aspects of this initiative should include the following nine 
essential steps.
1. Create a whole-of-government taskforce to 
focus intellectual resources
As the referendum window approaches, a standard Canberra 
interdepartmental committee would be inadequate to 
manage the concerted and enhanced response that’s 
required. A dedicated taskforce is needed to provide clear 
lines of authority for the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade to lead, rather than just chair discussions on 
cooperation between agencies. While this may seem a rather 
abstract point of administration, the reality is that Australia’s 
government agencies work best when either a crisis or 
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3. Develop a substantial development training 
package for Bougainville
An important part of the initiative would necessarily focus 
on capacity building. While some further training could be 
modelled on the Strongim Gavman Program, whose experts 
have helped rebuild administrative, legal and specialist 
technical capacity in key departments in Port Moresby, 
the package for Bougainville needs to focus more on basic 
government functions—delivering access to services, 
accelerating economic recovery and creating conducive 
conditions for job creation. The vital need is for improved 
ABG administration—essentially, the skills to be able to 
make good use of greater funding (for example, to engage 
contractors efficiently, effectively and transparently).
Because expanding the ABG’s capacity to govern partly 
depends on practical factors such as road transport, not 
every additional adviser would need to be a seconded 
Canberra technocrat or even a public servant. However, all 
would have to be effective in complex and sensitive cultural 
environments, such as those in which ex-combatants bid 
for contracts. The Australian Civilian Corps hasn’t proved 
its value yet, but it worked well to support PNG’s 2012 
election and might be useful in sufficient numbers to achieve 
an impact.
Increasing the existing focus on entrepreneurship could 
help accelerate recovery and access to basic services in 
a region where per capita income is rising but still at 40% 
of pre-conflict levels, about half the population is under 
20 years old, and a third of school-age children aren’t yet 
attending school.10 However, increasing activity in sectors 
such as retail, hospitality and transport requires access to 
skills, finance and insurance to keep expanding. Government 
assistance is needed, too, for example to help smallholders—
the essential backbone of Bougainville’s economy—deal with 
cocoa pod borer or to develop alluvial gold mining as a safer 
(and taxed) source of jobs and income.
Australian community organisations, NGOs and businesses 
have many of the skills needed on Bougainville, could 
reduce costs, and would bring other people-to-people and 
sustainability benefits. The taskforce should explore how 
to maximise the potential contribution to training from 
non-government sectors. The $100 million New Colombo 
Plan for young Australian leaders to study in the Asia–Pacific 
region could offer one such avenue, as long as the personal 
security situation remains manageable. Australians are 
government pressure forces a concerted and intense focus 
on delivering outcomes. Australia has learned this lesson 
from such experiences as developing counterterrorism 
strategies after the Bali bombings, and in the reinterventions 
in Afghanistan in 2005 and Timor-Leste and Solomon 
Islands in 2006. Just as the Abbott government has done in 
response to the boat people issue, very serious and sustained 
organisational priority needs to be given to Bougainville if 
any substantial progress is to be made.
A key duty for the whole-of-government taskforce must be to 
lead regular updates on the special development initiative for 
consideration by the National Security Committee of Cabinet. 
A standing taskforce should also harness expertise and 
support from Australia’s businesses, academics, NGOs and 
broader community.
2. Triple development assistance to Bougainville 
within current aid funding
A recent conference concluded that the key building blocks 
vital for a sustainable Bougainville are a more capable ABG, 
the full implementation of the peace agreement, a stronger 
economy, and further reconciliation and peacebuilding 
work. Those, in turn, required a speedier handover of legal 
powers, increased resources for the ABG and efforts to curb 
financial mismanagement.9
Only Australia has the combination of interests, economic 
clout and expertise to help PNG lead an international 
effort of that sort. We should consider developing the core 
components of such a package.
Australian development assistance spent on Bougainville 
should temporarily be tripled ahead of the referendum 
to $100 million per year by providing up to $40 million in 
budget supplementation and approximately doubling the 
$35 million currently spent on sectoral support and the 
activities of contracted advisers. Of course, this will be 
against the backdrop of a declining aid budget and at a time 
when AusAID has been administratively incorporated into 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, but it should 
be seen as a test of the Abbott government’s willingness 
to give substance to the idea of linking aid more directly to 
Australian strategic interests. An expanded aid program 
delivered now will create a substantial long-term cost saving 
if it helps us avoid a large-scale Defence-led intervention 
some years in the future.
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ABG to provide such assistance, which realistically can only 
be delivered by military experts.
Given the sort of planning and logistics effort that 
militaries can bring to bear in natural disaster-prone areas, 
humanitarian relief activities are another innocuous area for 
cooperation that no-one’s likely to object to. It should also 
be possible for parties to agree to unarmed construction 
experts from PNG’s Engineer Battalion contributing to 
appropriate civil–military tasks in less sensitive areas, given 
the need to reconstruct vital infrastructure. And military 
engineers could help destroy firearms collected by the sort 
of revived community-led program to locate and remove 
weapons discussed above, and could construct and maintain 
armouries if the PNG Government and the ABG decide to arm 
the Bougainville Police Service further down the track.
The ADF has sometimes resisted proposals to take on 
non-military tasks such as infrastructure development 
in the Pacific. The reluctance to construct roads or build 
schools is understandable, because those aren’t core 
military tasks and are a very costly way to deliver aid. It’s 
time to re-evaluate that approach. The ADF needs to find 
constructive ways to manifest its presence on Bougainville, 
ensure its welcome and get ‘boots on the ground’, as the 
phrase has it, more decisively through the island Pacific. If 
it was in Australia’s interests for the ADF to build sanitation 
systems and train carpenters in southern Afghanistan, it’s 
surely strategically useful to do some of that work in our 
immediate neighbourhood.
Australia also has an interest in making any low-key military 
presence on Bougainville multinational. The New Zealand 
Defence Force has been a useful long-term player on the 
island and can add significantly to Australian efforts. 
Pacific island forces like the Tonga Defence Service, the Fiji 
military (subject to Suva’s return to democracy next year) 
and various island police forces can play important roles, 
too, giving the region an active stake in building peace on 
Bougainville. Further afield, this would be a good opportunity 
for countries professing a deep commitment to Asia–Pacific 
security—Canada, the Europeans and others—to make small 
but practical contributions to rebuilding, for example with 
military engineers. Australia’s role would be to encourage 
such assistance, channel it into a common effort and 
integrate the contributions of interested countries into a 
unified assistance plan, in close consultation with the PNG 
Government and the ABG.
relatively underrepresented among the approximately 
30 international volunteers currently working with the ABG 
and communities in areas such as communications, business 
and health.
4. Deploy an AFP International Deployment 
Group training team
Bougainville’s development is impossible without security. 
Half a dozen New Zealand Police have remained, mainly to 
help recruit, train and manage Bougainville’s Community 
Auxiliary Police selected by village chiefs to work in rural 
areas, since the AFP contingent withdrew in 2005. But the 
fledgling Bougainville Police Service will require further 
assistance with leadership, investigative, mediation and 
leadership skills to continue developing into a professional, 
trusted and capable organisation as the referendum 
approaches. The need is partly to support disarmament, 
which has largely stalled as one of three pillars of the peace 
agreement since 2003, and without which future minor 
incidents will be much more likely to escalate into serious 
violence. A police role supporting community-led, incentives-
based, voluntary disarmament efforts would help promote a 
demilitarising logic.
5. Initiate low-key Defence involvement in 
rebuilding efforts
The ADF and partner defence forces should also be able 
to assist confidence-building. Specialist logistics and 
capabilities will be needed to sustain a larger international 
development presence in the region until such support can 
be provided commercially. Appropriately enough, there 
are sensitivities in Port Moresby and on Bougainville about 
the presence of military forces, perhaps especially the ADF. 
Defence should start by adding a dialogue on Bougainville 
to its next round of discussions in Port Moresby. This should 
include shared planning and intelligence assessments about 
the situation on the island.
Looking further ahead, because any ADF activities on 
Bougainville would need to be conducted in partnership with 
the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) as host nation 
military, and at the invitation of the ABG, it will be important 
to identify opportunities to provide useful, nonthreatening 
assistance. Locating and safely disposing of large quantities 
of World War II ordnance—still dangerous in its own right as 
well as for its potential to arm new fighters—is one such area. 
The ADF is scoping a request by the PNG Government and the 
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of experience to pass on leadership and technical skills 
alongside the seconded Australian and New Zealand officials 
and experts.
8. Empower women and community leaders
Another helpful factor in earlier peace efforts that’s likely to 
be important again relates to strengthening the roles of local 
leaders, especially prominent women, chiefs and former 
commanders on both sides, as voices for peace.
Female leaders took some of the earliest and most 
courageous steps leading to the formation of the Bougainville 
Transitional Government in early 1995 and to start bringing 
communities back together. Sponsoring their discussions and 
outreach across Bougainville with women’s groups in Port 
Moresby and internationally would be a useful investment, 
and consistent with the Coalition’s pre-election policy 
statement on foreign affairs, which listed engaging female 
leaders in the region as one of just eight identified initiatives.
Genuine military leaders from the crisis era, now mostly in 
their fifties, also have a strong sense of ownership of the 
peace agreement, understand the complexities and language 
of peacemaking, and could prove to be the only figures able 
to contain younger hotheads. They, too, should be supported.
9. Actively foster PNG Government – ABG 
dialogue
Finally, to reduce the chance of disaster as the referendum 
approaches, Australian, New Zealand and other partners’ 
efforts to build channels for regular constructive dialogue 
between the PNG Government and the ABG—currently 
occurring mainly behind the scenes—need to move into the 
foreground. Given how far all parties have fallen behind in 
implementing the peace agreement, a frank, reasonably 
positive relationship between the parties is vital to catch up. 
Although quarrels such as the recent row over funding have 
been rare, the parties’ lack of regular communications could 
be just as harmful, causing delays to pile up, fuelling mutual 
frustration and damaging trust.
According to New Zealand Foreign Minister McCully, Prime 
Minister O’Neill and President Momis are ‘actually closer 
together on some matters than they realise’ but may need 
further support to work together more effectively. Although 
neither party is likely to enjoy being pressed to talk, and 
‘megaphone diplomacy’ would be counterproductive, 
regional partners invested a lot in the 1997–2003 intervention 
and have a legitimate stake in trying to preserve peace. 
6. Refocus international awareness and 
encourage donor funding through UN 
mechanisms
Australia’s support may be indispensable, but that 
doesn’t mean Canberra should go it alone. International 
organisations—especially the UN and the Commonwealth—
helped address past troubles, remain engaged and could 
help again. The UN’s Port Moresby office recently helped 
secure PNG eligibility for the Peacebuilding Fund. However, 
such funding and practical assistance currently look set 
to remain modest compared with Bougainville’s need. 
International arenas for encouraging other donors (such as 
Japan, which contributes to Bougainville’s road network) and 
the IMF or other mechanisms for collecting and dispersing 
funding to the ABG could prove equally significant.
Australia should leverage our UN Security Council seat to 
promote world attention and gain substantial funding, 
including by sponsoring eminent persons’ visits. We have 
an opportunity to lift the level of international attention 
on Bougainvillean matters during our second rotational 
month-long term as Chair of the Security Council in 
November 2014. By then, the elements of an Australian 
strategy, preferably with substantial international support, 
will be in place. As we near the end of 2014, the 2015 notional 
earliest date for a referendum on independence will loom 
much closer and should engage attention at the UN. We need 
a strategy for making the best use of that timing while we still 
occupy a Security Council seat.
7. Mobilise regional support
Regional countries would have a special role among 
international partners. New Zealand played an important 
part at key points in the peace process, while Fiji, Vanuatu 
and Tonga participated in Bougainville peacekeeping. 
Soldiers or police from all 16 Pacific Islands Forum states 
were vital to RAMSI’s success in neighbouring Solomon 
Islands. Broad regional participation would help reassure 
Port Moresby, the ABG and Bougainvilleans alike that 
neighbours with a good feel for the situation were paying 
close attention to all parties’ behaviour. Active involvement 
by a range of countries with a diversity of sympathetic views 
would also dilute lingering suspicions that Australia is either 
pushing for Bougainvillean independence or opposed to it at 
any cost.
At the practical level, officials from Pacific Islands Forum 
countries could be especially helpful in capacity-building 
the Bougainville Public Service, drawing on a wide range 
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Given the extent of the social, economic, political and 
infrastructure rebuilding required, budget supplementation 
of around $40 million per year (which would match the PNG 
Government’s 100 million kina high-impact grant) would be 
needed to have a substantial effect. The focus would be on 
service delivery as well as policy areas of the ABG. Australia 
should press other donors, bilaterally and in international 
forums; we could consider offering to match contributions 
from other countries up to a certain amount, and we should 
welcome secondments of suitable experts, and not just from 
South Pacific partners. We must encourage PNG to meet its 
commitments in as timely and dependable a way, and with as 
few strings attached, as possible.
In addition to the budget supplementation, Australia should 
consider about doubling current funding for sectoral support, 
advisers and their operating costs in order to pursue the nine 
components of the initiative recommended in this report. 
Here, the aim would categorically not be to replicate the sort 
of RAMSI-style shadow government necessary following the 
collapse of governance in the Solomons. Rather, the extra 
advisers would mentor the Bougainville Public Service and 
ensure that the temporary budget supplementation is spent 
effectively and accountably, to the point that they can hand 
over to the ABG and depart as quickly as possible.
It’s not sensible to be too prescriptive about the shape of 
an expanded adviser group, because it’s essential that it be 
based on the ABG’s assessment of what additional support 
it needs and can absorb. The package would also depend on 
the Australian Government’s evaluation of what’s required, 
authorisation by the PNG Government, and what support 
New Zealand and our Pacific partners are prepared to offer. 
As an indication, activities beyond the scope of current 
support might include:
–     establishment costs, housing, and 
additional office space within ABG HQ 
in Buka $2 million
–     operating costs for a three-person 
task force in Canberra (agencies 
absorb salaries) $1 million
–     an adviser plus operating costs to 
support volunteers (NGOs, youth 
ambassadors etc.) $1 million
–     10 AFP International Deployment 
Group personnel to work with New 
Zealand Police capacity-building the 
Bougainville Police $5 million
Helping to create a secretariat for the Joint Supervisory Body, 
to potentially replace the under-resourced and ineffective 
National Coordination Office for Bougainville Affairs that was 
supposed to help mediate between parties, could be a start. 
Bolstering the UN’s role as a mediator could also be useful, as 
it’s trusted by all sides.
Indicative costs
To be successful, this initiative would require a lengthy and 
significant funding commitment at a time of real budget 
pressures and when $4.5 billion has just been cut out of 
the four-year forward estimates for aid. However, acting 
preventively will reduce the likelihood of much greater 
expenditure, as well as serious strategic costs, within the 
decade. It sits comfortably with a ‘less Geneva, more Jakarta’ 
paradigm and a focus on practical challenges in Australia’s 
immediate neighbourhood.
While the initiative’s final cost would depend on referendum 
dates, all parties’ continuing commitment and the success of 
its early stages, an initial three-year phase from the beginning 
of 2014–15 would cost up to an estimated $70 million per year 
beyond current spending.
Front-loading the investment starting just over 12 months 
before the referendum window opens would build capacity 
in the Bougainville Public Service and, if successful, create 
a virtuous cycle by reducing the staff numbers necessary 
for subsequent phases while boosting the likelihood of 
success. Government would need to consider options to 
support a second phase closer to the referendum, and a 
third phase to help implement results, subject to the parties’ 
continuing support.
Appropriately managed budget supplementation would 
be an essential part of the package to make genuine 
autonomy viable. That element could be jointly co-funded 
on a partnership basis by matching some PNG Government 
grants. It would be administered by ABG personnel mentored 
by experts from the initiative, in conjunction with the new UN 
mechanism to coordinate donor funding.
Budgetary aid is about as fashionable as wearing socks 
with sandals, could stretch the ABG’s short-term capacity 
to absorb help, is problematic for longer term sustainability 
and accountability, and is an uneasy fit with Australian 
Government’s commitment to ‘aid for trade’. However, for 
the moment the ABG needs operating funds even more than 
good advice if it’s to have any chance of success.
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than PNG in finding a sustainable, peaceful solution for 
Bougainville, but both countries have a strong interest in 
preserving stability, the best chance for which lies in an 
orderly referendum delivering a broadly acceptable result. 
They also share interests in a result that preserves PNG’s 
status as a successful multi-ethnic state; avoids a new 
mini-state emerging with such little preparation that it would 
be marginally viable, highly dependent on PNG and Australia, 
and potentially unstable; prevents the two close partners 
falling on opposite sides of a major row; and avoids the need 
for a post-referendum military intervention likely to strain 
ties between Canberra and Port Moresby far more than a 
partnership that obviates the need for a stabilisation mission. 
Thus, we have strong incentives to collaborate closely.
The key is to establish the initiative as a true partnership, 
with Port Moresby as a senior member and in the driver’s 
seat as much as possible. Here, PNG legislation similar to 
the treaty-status protocol establishing the Bougainville 
Transition Team in June 2003 or legislation covering RAMSI 
in the Solomons that year would be useful to clarify each 
party’s rights and responsibilities. The risk that moving such 
enabling legislation might make the initiative hostage to a 
vexatious constitutional challenge seems low, since the PNG 
Parliament’s unanimous vote to amend the Constitution 
to give effect to the peace agreement came into effect a 
decade ago.
Still, a ‘no disadvantage’ test for aid to other parts of the 
country might be necessary to make such legislation and 
related deals acceptable in the PNG Parliament. Here, the 
principle contained in the peace agreement that new foreign 
assistance secured by the ABG must not reduce the value 
of aid available elsewhere in PNG might usefully apply. 
Additional funding would need to remain within bilateral 
aid treaty arrangements. But there’s no reason why further 
increased assistance can’t be directed to Bougainville within 
the health, education, law and justice, and transport sectors 
or via a new priority of implementing the peace agreement.
One thing a change of government does is to create the basis 
for starting a new conversation between Canberra and Port 
Moresby. PNG played into Australia’s election debate in ways 
that make it sensible for Mr Abbott and Mr O’Neill to clear 
the air about the bilateral relationship. A serious-minded 
Australian commitment to Port Moresby seeking a shared 
approach to Bougainville may provide a useful way to 
refocus the relationship in the interests of both countries. 
Importantly, O’Neill has welcomed Australia’s decision to 
tighten aid targeting and seems likely to play ball as long as 
PNG remains able to help steer.
–     additional business, governance, 
community and other advisers, as 
requested by the ABG $5 million
–     a package of low-key defence initiatives 
(including initial airlift) $5 million
–     community outreach to raise awareness of 
autonomy/independence requirements $1 million
–     extra budget for community-led voluntary 
programs to locate and remove weapons $1 million
–     operating budget to facilitate involvement 
by experts from Pacific Islands 
Forum countries $1 million
–     operating budget to support the 
empowerment of local leaders $1 million
–     an adviser and budget to recruit quality 
administrators from elsewhere in PNG $2 million
–     an adviser and budget to establish 
a Bougainville Public Service 
graduate program $1 million
–     support for international outreach 
and engagement (such as eminent 
persons’ visits) $1 million
–     operating budget to facilitate regular PNG 
Government – ABG dialogue $1 million
 
Reflecting the importance of Australia’s national interests 
and responsibilities in our immediate neighbourhood, the 
$70 million additional cost per year of the first three-year 
phase of the initiative should be offset against the current 
aid program. The spending should be above current 
development assistance to PNG for the reasons set 
out below.
Promoting PNG Government buy-in: 
fostering an active partnership
Besides cost, the greatest obstacle to the proposed approach 
could be resistance by the PNG Government. The bilateral 
relationship is healthy, and on balance the ‘PNG solution’ 
is deepening the sense of a more equal partnership and 
promoting cooperation in areas such as policing. But Port 
Moresby, at once very confident and beleaguered, is in no 
mood to be lectured and pushed around on Bougainville or 
any other issue.
At the same time, Australia’s and PNG’s similar national 
interests on Bougainville mean that sovereignty sensitivities 
should be manageable. No country has a deeper stake 
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Next steps
As a start, the annual Australia–PNG Ministerial Forum in 
December will provide an opportunity to signal concern 
that the peace process is adrift, and to start developing a 
plan to work together as partners to get it back on track. 
For Australia, Bougainville presents potential risks and 
rewards. Primarily, though, the greatest risks would arise 
from Canberra’s inactivity. There’s clearly a short-term option 
open to the Abbott government to make no changes to the 
current cautious policy approach. There’s no immediate sign 
that violent conflict is about to erupt, and the referendum’s 
at least two years away, but the cost of drift may well be an 
expensive and potentially bloody Australian-led stabilisation 
operation not far in the future.
Alternatively, the rewards for taking a more proactive 
approach are potentially high. Australia has an opportunity 
to show that we can do more than ‘send in the troops’—that 
we have the nous and resources to avert the need for military 
intervention through concerted whole-of-government action 
to create the conditions for lasting peace. In many ways this 
would be the missing conclusion to the story of stabilisation 
operations in the Pacific begun by the Howard government 
in Bougainville in 1998. Preventive diplomatic action taken 
now will establish the Abbott government’s credentials as 
a peacemaker at a time of strategic uncertainty, when the 
region is looking for some calm and far-sighted leadership.
Subject to the interest of the Australian, PNG and 
Autonomous Bougainville governments, ASPI would be 
pleased to facilitate a dialogue to discuss the parameters of 
the sort of package proposed in this report.
Acronyms and abbreviations
ABG Autonomous Bougainville Government
ADF Australian Defence Force
AFP Australian Federal Police
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army
NGO non-government organisation
PMG Peace Monitoring Group
PNG Papua New Guinea
PNGDF Papua New Guinea Defence Force
RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
UN United Nations
Promoting acceptance by 
Bougainvilleans: reinforcing Australia’s 
honest broker credentials
Although Bougainvilleans have the most to lose if the 
implementation of the peace agreement remains stalled, 
they too may be wary about the proposed initiative, given 
the continuing deep divisions, socioeconomic dislocation 
and mistrust in a post-conflict society. Many Bougainvilleans 
have a poor understanding of what autonomy and 
independence actually mean or require to succeed. In this 
fractured environment, rumours, conspiracy theories and 
misunderstandings remain rife and can be manipulated. 
While the 1997–2003 peace monitors were necessarily 
scrupulously neutral, a level of suspicion remains about 
Australian motives relating to independence and mining.
For Canberra, an autonomy or independence outcome 
would each produce costs and benefits, and neither would 
intrinsically ensure or exclude the possibility of violence. 
The essential thing to secure Australia’s interests is that the 
referendum process be conducted reasonably smoothly and 
be seen to be legitimate, and that all parties can live with 
the result. Being up-front about the benefits of giving real 
autonomy a chance to work, to enable Bougainvilleans to 
understand the options and exercise a choice between two 
viable alternatives, will help protect Canberra’s reputation.
But Australia must resist any inclination to put all its eggs in 
one basket. Actively advocating an autonomy vote as the only 
acceptable outcome, no matter how seemingly beneficial, 
would be wishful thinking rather than a sound basis for 
policy. And it would almost certainly be counterproductive 
given prevailing suspicions, would be more likely to push 
undecided Bougainvilleans towards the opposite outcome 
and, more crucially, would be destabilising. Instead, we need 
a creative, flexible and transparent strategy able to keep 
turning the heat down in response to inevitable disputes and 
minor clashes, and to deliver a range of potentially positive 
longer term outcomes.
To give the package time to work, and to provide certainty 
and stability over the next several years, it would also 
be useful if Port Moresby and the ABG reached an early 
agreement on a referendum date towards the end of the 
2015–20 window. The most pressing danger probably stems 
from the possibility that one party or the other could try to 
unilaterally launch or delay the referendum, neither of which 
would accord with the peace agreement, but either of which 
could happen if frustration continues to build.
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Appendix: Important dates in Bougainville’s history
1885 German New Guinea Company establishes control of Bougainville
1893 British protectorate extended over the southern islands in the Solomons chain
1900 Germany withdraws claim to the Solomons, except Bougainville, in return for Western Samoa
1914 Australia occupies Bougainville as part of German New Guinea (League of Nations mandate in 1920)
1942 Invasion by Japanese; US Marines land in November 1943 (later Australian, NZ, Fiji forces)
1961 First PNG Legislative Council elections involving the indigenous population
1964 First efforts to explore Bougainville’s resources by Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia (CRA) Ltd
1969 CRA subsidiary Bougainville Copper Ltd opens Panguna mine (production from 1972)
1972 Bougainville Special Political Committee created to consider future political status
December 1973 PNG granted self-government
1974 Bougainville Copper Agreement renegotiated for more equitable distribution of benefits
28 May 1975 Interim Provincial Government in Bougainville agrees to secede from PNG
1 September 1975 Interim Provincial Government declares independence; unrecognised by UN
16 September 1975 PNG independence
1976 Bougainville Agreement establishes provincial government (system later extended across PNG)
1981 Disputes intensify over the status of and income from the mine
March 1988 500 members of a new landowners faction demonstrate over mine revenue and impacts
November 1988 Dissidents walk out of talks, steal mining explosives, begin sabotage campaign
March 1989 PNGDF arrives to reinforce counterproductively heavy-handed police riot squads
May 1989 Violence continues to escalate; a state of emergency declared; mine forced to close
July 1989 Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) created
March 1990 First ceasefire; withdrawal of security forces overseen by international observers
17 May 1990 Rebel leader Francis Ona pronounces a unilateral declaration of independence
September 1990 PNGDF lands at Buka at invitation of local leaders distressed by rising civil war
October 1994 Rebel leaders boycott Arawa peace talks run by South Pacific Peacekeeping Force
April 1995 Bougainville Transitional Government established; recognised by PNG
December 1995 PNGDF fires on BRA members returning from UN/Commonwealth peace talks in Cairns
September 1996 Failed Operation High Speed II followed by killing of 10 PNGDF personnel
October 1996 Bougainville Transitional Government Premier Miriung assassinated, allegedly by security forces
March 1997 PNGDF Commander Singirok ejects Sandline mercenaries hired to reopen the mine
October 1997 Second Burnham peace talks establish a truce (truce monitors agreed to in Cairns)
January 1998 Lincoln Agreement paves the way for a permanent ceasefire on 30 April
1 May 1998 Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) replaces NZ-led truce monitors
May 1999 Former rebel Joseph Kabui elected head of Bougainville People’s Congress
2000 Reconciliation following political and legal challenges to Bougainville People’s Congress by Governor John Momis
August 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement signed at Arawa
March 2002 PNG Parliament amends the Constitution to accommodate the peace agreement
June 2003 A small, civilian, Bougainville Transition Team replaces the PMG until year’s end
July 2003 UN Observers Mission to Bougainville certifies that weapons disposal is complete
June 2005 Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) formed after a successful election
February 2006 Me’ekamui fraudster ‘King’ Noah Musingku’s Fijian mercenaries deported
June 2008 ABG President Kabui dies in office; former rebel James Tanis elected in by-election
May 2010 Second ABG elections result in the election of President Momis
August 2011–12 PNG political attention absorbed by Somare–O’Neill–Namah constitutional crisis
September 2013 Draft Joint Review of Autonomy Arrangements by ABG and PNG Government
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